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Bulgarian society has a successful history of maintaining a relatively peaceful 
multicultural environment over centuries.  This thesis is a comparative analysis of 
three transitional periods in Bulgaria coinciding with 1) the latter years of Ottoman 
dominion: 1762-1877, 2) the end of the Balkan Wars and World Wars I and II: 1878-
1947, and 3) the latter years of the Communist dominion: 1947-1989.  These periods 
will be analyzed with the aim to understand the role that regional political agendas 
have played in shaping an imagined Bulgarian national identity.  It will be shown that 
when it has occurred, identity-based conflict in Bulgaria can be better explained by 
examining the contributions of nationalist political influences from 1876 – 1989 on 
identity construction rather than an inherent Balkan propensity to religious and ethnic 
intolerance.  The Bulgarian case is especially relevant to understanding national 
identity construction in the Balkan region while holding out the possibility for various 
religious, linguistic, and ethnic groups to coexist peacefully in a heterogeneous 
environment. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
The frozen image of the Balkans, set in its general parameters around World 
War I, has been reproduced almost without variation over the next decades 
and operates as a discourse (Todorova 1997, 184).  
 
A. Competing Views of Identity-Based National Conflict in the Balkans 
While many contemporary Bulgarians view themselves to be part of Southeastern 
Europe or as one of the newest member states of the expanding European Union, ―most 
people in the West refer to that region as simply ‗the Balkans,‘ a name that immediately 
evokes ethnic conflict, crime and instability (Van Ham 2001, 5).‖  This perception of 
the Balkans is indeed so prevalent in Western thought that the word ―balkanize‖ is now 
defined by Merriam-Webster as ―to break up (as a region or group) into smaller and 
often hostile units.‖1   
It is clear to anyone studying the history of the Balkans that there is ample evidence 
of powerful cycles of conflict which have repeatedly shaped the ethnic and religious 
identities as well as the geographic boundaries of this region.  Yet, how does one 
approach the study of this region‘s periodic eruptions into national identity-based 
conflict while not also acknowledging the rich history of multiethnic heterogeneity 
under which generations of Muslims and Christians lived in relative harmony with one 
another?  Is there a primordial propensity to ethnic and religious violence in the 
Balkans as so often seems to be expressed in popular understandings since the dawn of 
the 20th century or are there other theoretical factors which might better explain these 
periods of conflict?   
                                                     
1
 Merriam Webster's Online Dictionary, accessed on March 31, 2008 at http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/balkanize.  
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This thesis will address popular conceptions of the Balkans as a region of loosely 
constrained internecine religious and ethnic tensions.  It will introduce the alternative 
hypothesis that the region, Bulgaria in particular, has a long history of heterogeneity 
and that concrete political factors better account for its periodic ethnic and religious 
conflict rather than the absence of a Balkan capacity for peaceful coexistence of 
heterogeneous groups.   
It is a comparative analysis of the three transitional periods in Bulgaria coinciding 
with 1) the latter years of Ottoman dominion: 1762-1877, 2) the end of the Balkan 
Wars and World Wars I and II: 1878-1947, and 3) the latter years of the Communist 
dominion: 1947-1989.  These periods will be analyzed with the aim to understand the 
role that regional political agendas have played in shaping an imagined Bulgarian 
national identity.   
This Bulgarian case is especially relevant to understanding identity-based conflict 
in the Balkan region as national identity constructions have resulted in drastically 
differing outcomes in Bulgaria and neighboring Yugoslavia, which share a similar 
cultural and ethnic legacy of the Ottoman Empire.  In other words, both Bulgaria and 
Yugoslavia faced similar national identity tensions between heterogeneous ethnic and 
religious population demographics as well as in defining themselves vis-à-vis the Great 
Powers.  Yet at the same time, the Bulgarian homogenizing experiments never resulted 
in the sheer numbers of mass killings which were witnessed throughout the late 1980s 
and early 1990s among the peoples of the former Yugoslav republics.  If it can be 
demonstrated that the Bulgarian case is an exception to stereotypes of irreversible 
3 
escalating identity-based conflict in the Balkan region, then further research would be 
justified into looking at other transitional states facing strong national or identity-based 
tensions such as Turkey, Rwanda, Sudan, Iraq, Israel/Palestine, etc.  Might that mean 
that there is a greater chance of mitigating and/or perhaps reversing national identity 
tensions if the relevant political causal factors could be identified and clarified over and 
against stereotypical appeals to ethnic and religious roots to violence? 
 
B. Thesis 
Identity-based conflict in Bulgaria can be better explained by examining the 
contributions of nationalist political influences from 1876 – 1989 on identity construction 
rather than an inherent Balkan propensity to religious and ethnic intolerance.  
 
C. Literature Review 
Nationalism 
Before turning to a more in-depth review of the literature surrounding national 
identity conflict in Bulgaria, it is important to situate this analysis within the broader 
theoretical framework of nationalism within some common approaches to define and 
explain its origins.  Among social science theorists, there are two dominant conflicting 
views of nationalism which can be identified as primordialist/nationalist and 
modernist/constructivist which have been actively debated for decades.   
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Primordialist (and Ethnosymbolic) Nationalism 
For the primordialist, nationalism has to some extent or another always existed 
throughout history as various ethnic groups have sought after security or legitimacy by 
defining themselves over and against their neighbors.   
Tatu Vanhanen explains his views of the origins of universal ethnic conflict in that 
it is an inherent part of our human nature for all ethnicities to resort to ethnic nepotism 
when there is a fear of losing advantage.  His concept of ethnic nepotism is that first of 
all ―significant ethnic divisions tend to lead to ethnic interest conflicts in all societies‖ 
and secondly ―the more a society is ethnically divided, the more political and other 
interest conflict tends to become channeled into ethnic lines (Vanhanen 1999, 58).‖  
His fundamental thesis is that ―Our shared disposition to ethnic nepotism is the 
common factor behind all ethnic conflicts (66).‖  While I sympathize with Vanhanen‘s 
pessimistic view of our all-too-frequent motivation to seek after our self-interest, his 
approach depends on static overgeneralization and cannot be sustained when 
confronting all of the complexities inherent in the shifting and negotiated 
heterogeneous milieu of the Post-Ottoman Balkans as will be demonstrated in the 
subsequent chapters.   
Anthony B. Smith champions a moderated primordial view in what he calls the 
ethnosymbolist approach which he claims has more in common with the modernist 
approach since he too claims that the nation is a creation of the modern period.  He 
continues to be identified with the primordialist approach, however, because he 
maintains that although the nation might be a modern creation, a successful nationalist 
5 
program must draw upon preexisting and ancient common memories and identities 
(religious and ethnic) in order to form a national sense of belonging.  Thus his approach 
seems to be extended from that of the primordialist with the contention that prenational 
building blocks must be present in order for a nation to develop.  While the nation may 
not be primordial, the prenational identities have certainly existed for long periods of 
time. 
In a debate between himself and Ernest Gellner, Do Nations Have Navels?, Smith 
insists that nations do have navels, which symbolize the prenational building block of 
nationalism.  In fact, they are so essential to the development of nations that they must 
be invented if they didn‘t previously exist (Smith 1996).  While I believe Smith 
overstates the necessity of the existence of these building blocks before a nation can 
develop, he does offer some very useful explanations of how the pre-modern building 
blocks, if they exist,
2
 can be co-opted during the subsequent shaping of national identity 
consciousness during the modernization period in ways that supplement and 




Benedict Anderson and Ernest Gellner are two of the more noted modernist 
nationalism theorists whose works have influenced this research.  Benedict Anderson 
defines the nation as ―an imagined political community - and imagined as both 
                                                     
2
 Author‘s emphasis and not that of Smith‘s reasoning. 
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inherently limited and sovereign.  It is imagined because the members of even the 
smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear 
of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion (Anderson 1991, 
6).‖  Anderson‘s views convincingly resonate with the development of that nationalist 




 centuries and will greatly inform the discussion below in 
chapter two.  In particular, it is through Anderson‘s analysis of the role of vernacular 
and print language development that it will become clear how political purposes can 
and have shaped the imaginary Bulgarian national identity.   
Ernest Gellner also contributes to the discussion by describing how the shift from 
pre-modern to modern times puts more practical homogenizing pressures on previously 
heterogeneous contexts.  For example, he contends that in pre-modern times the 
presence of heterogeneity within a regional or local village context was easily tolerated 
and perhaps even desirable.  ―The social situation of a peasant was in no way 
aggravated by the fact that he speaks an idiom distinct from that of his bailiff, landlord, 
shopkeeper, innkeeper, priest, and local political overlord.  They know each other so 
well that they communicated only too easily without the use of lucid and explicit prose.  
The differences in their speech actually help to avoid ambiguities of status and hence 
friction (Gellner 1997, 84-85).‖   
But this changes with the rise of modernity.  As mentioned in reference above in his 
debate with Anthony Smith, Gellner makes the case that nations don‘t have navels 
because they are modern creations and therefore have no need for an actual ontology of 
prenational conditionalities in order for a national consciousness to develop but instead 
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are a response to modernity (Gellner 1996).  With modernity, the status quo necessarily 
must change and nationalism enters into the picture and becomes a necessary part of 
facilitating economic interchange through its homogenizing pressures. ―All this 
changes when men move into an economically and politically centralized, mobile, 
anonymous and egalitarian world‖… which leads to the ―need for a shared, 
standardized, politically underwritten ‗national‘ culture (Gellner 1997, 84-85).‖ 
Another nationalism theorist is Rogers Brubaker who also provides some useful 
understanding of the patterns of ethnic unmixing during the aftermath of the breakup of 
the Ottoman Empire which will bear upon this thesis in chapters two and three.  For 
Brubaker, there is no ―foreordained‖ outcome of how ethnic groups might choose to 
differentiate themselves other than in response to more significant political pressure 
that often have more to do with economic rather than xenophobic realities (Brubaker 
1995, 203).  
The modernist/constructivist approach in which nationalism is viewed as a 
relatively recent construction coinciding with the advent of modernity is the theoretical 
approach that is more closely identifiable with this thesis.  Therefore, drawing upon this 
approach, this thesis will seek to explain the evidence of national identity-based conflict 
in Bulgaria in decidedly anti-primordialist terms while at the same time drawing upon 
some other theorists such as Smith and Brubaker to help acknowledge the reality of 
ethnic identity differentiation.  Ultimately, while recognizing that this ethnic and 
religious differentiation is present throughout the various periods, this thesis will show 
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that the primary factors contributing to periodic outbreaks of conflict were political and 
not unavoidably based upon ethno-religious differences.   
Bulgarian Nationalism 
In order to have a foundational background for a regional understanding of 
nationalism it is important to recognize the historical milieu of the 500-year Ottoman 
domination (1393-1878) over the geographic territory that encompasses present-day 
Bulgaria.  It is the principle role of this Ottoman period that I believe provides a legacy 
for constructions of Bulgarian national identity.  This legacy, as will be shown in 
successive chapters, provided the core identity building blocks utilized by successive 
nationalist campaigns to pursue deliberate agendas of either homogenization or 
heterogeneity within the Bulgarian geographic territory.  In rejecting the idea that the 
presence of heterogeneity was maintained only through active opposition to the foreign 
Ottoman domination throughout the territory, I maintain instead that it was 
heterogeneity that was the more natural legacy of the Ottoman period.  It was a 




 century leaders of the Bulgarian 
nationalist movement that consciously started the homogenization ball rolling through 
employing the rejection of ―non-Bulgarian‖ identity to further their political goals of 
autonomy which were successfully achieved in 1878.  This will be detailed further in 
chapter two. 
It is precisely in the realm of Balkan national identity construction that the works of 
Maria Todorova and Mary Neuburger are particularly informative with regards to this 
legacy.  While they differ from one another in their respective conceptualizations of the 
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role of European distinctions of Western vs. Oriental theoretical frameworks in 
understanding how these identities are constructed, they both share a common approach 
in helping to elucidate the ebb and flow of repeated negotiations of identities in relation 
to an imagined ―Other‖ whether that is defined in terms of binary oppositions in 
language (Slavic/Turkic or Greek/Slavic), religion (Christian/Muslim), or physical 
geography (Balkans/Europe, Europe/Asia, or West/East). 
Maria Todorova serves to identify two primary interpretations of the Ottoman 
legacy in the Balkans.  The first, which she calls a ―legacy of perception,‖ was that the 
Ottoman Empire was a ―religiously, socially, institutionally, and even racially alien 
imposition on autochthonous Christian medieval societies (Todorova 1997, 162-164).‖  
The other, which she calls a ―legacy of continuity,‖ is that of a ―complex symbiosis of 
Turkish, Islamic, and Byzantine/Balkan traditions‖ in which ―several centuries of 
coexistence cannot but have produced a common legacy‖ or heterogeneity (Todorova 
1997, 164-166).  While not denying that real history of identity-based conflict in the 
Balkans, Todorova challenges prevailing stereotypes of the Balkans as a frozen image 
in time as mentioned above or as a place doomed to repeat one interpretation of its own 
history again and again, namely, that of national identity-based conflict.  Instead she 
maintains that the Balkans have a ―powerful ontology that deserves serious and 
complex study, and it is an ontology of constant and profound change (184).‖   
Mary Neuburger also highlights vacillations and fluidity between categorizations in 
which ―the Bulgarian nation building project both accepted and rejected, by turns 
appropriated and dispossessed both the East and the West in its search for national 
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grounding (Neuburger 2004, 3).  Furthermore, she explores aspects of Muslim agency 
as they ―enter the story as navigators of modernity on their own terms‖ and thus not 
relegated to being only ―victims‖ of the ethnic Bulgarian ―perpetrators (12-13).‖  It is in 
the ―ambiguous interplay of sameness and difference, brother and enemy, flavored by 
the Bulgarian-Muslim as well as the Bulgarian-European encounter‖ that  Neuburger 
conceives of a ―conceptual axis around which understanding all of Balkan nationalisms 
and Muslim/non-Muslim relations should revolve (6).‖ 
In some of the other literature reviewed, broad patterns of consensus with 
Todorova‘s two positions of Ottoman legacy as ―perception‖ or ―continuity‖ can be 
identified as one looks at how the various authors understand whether or not Bulgaria 
exhibits a Balkan propensity to violent identity-based conflict, both of which have 
historical (18th and 19th century) and contemporary (20th century) expressions.  
Whether expressed in contemporary or historical literature (Hilendarski 1999, Vazov 
2000), the region is commonly believed to be prone to ethnic conflict, which is merely 
a natural reflex reaction for the Bulgarians as a dominant population group to utilize its 
power to eliminate the ―Other‖ that threatens it (Nelson 1991).  This primordialist bias, 
although not stated in those terms, is present in several of the writings reviewed as is 
evidenced in a supposition that had the Bulgarians found a more efficient modality, 
they would have been as ruthless as Yugoslav leaders in the subsequent years (Bell-
Fialkoff 1993, Bojkov 2004, Eminov 1997, Mahon 1999, Nitzova 1997).   
On the other hand, a second view found in the literature seems to point to a lack of 
true commitment on the part of the Bulgarian leadership to really follow through with 
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the large scale ambitions of forcible assimilation once it became clear that success 
would only be achieved through more violent means (Angelov and Marshall 2006, 
Petkova 2002, Vassilev 2002).  A key part of this view is that Bulgarian society had a 
successful history of maintaining its multicultural environment with tolerance which 
essentially squares with the primary assertions of both Neuburger and Todorova.   
As a result, the risk of instability would be greater than any supposed gains to be 
found through a more thorough ethnic cleansing attempt similar to what would 
subsequently take place in Yugoslavia (Angelov and Marshall 2006, Fotev 1999, 
Petkova 2002, Vassilev 2002).  Again, there are historical examples of this 
multicultural identity present in Aleko Konstantinov‘s 19th century fictional Bulgarian 
character, Bai Ganyu Balkanski, who is Bulgaria‘s most universally recognized 
Bulgarian literary creation (Konstantinov 1992, 1999).  
A weakness in the existing literature is in the failure to comprehensively address the 
gaps over which paradigm more correctly understands the Bulgarian situation, 
especially as it bears upon the final historical period under consideration here, that of 
the Rebirth/Revival assimilation campaign against the ethnic Turks during the latter 
years of the Communist period.  Both Neuburger and Todorova are confident about 
recognizing the complexities associated with identity-based conflict in Bulgaria and 
understand this being rooted in how national identity has progressively been 
constructed over time.   
Todorova contributes much to the literature through her discussions of the Ottoman 
legacy as well as through her explorations of the historical trajectory of how the 
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Balkans have been viewed as a type of hybrid or bastardized European child.  Yet she 
doesn‘t seem particularly interested in analyzing the depth of the interplay among the 
various imagined identities within Bulgaria in order to provide a comprehensive 
understanding of the periods under review.  Neuburger, on the other hand, is much 
more interested in examining the issues that Todorova overlooks, but primarily from 
the point of view of the Muslim minorities.  This thesis will attempt to contribute to the 
existing literature by providing a comprehensive argument which often parallels that of 
Todorova and Neuburger, but at the same time, extends the comprehensive comparative 
analysis beyond that of the Christian/Turk, Balkan/Other, East/West oppositional 
frameworks by examining neglected examples of imagined nationalist heterogenizing 
and homogenizing influences during the periods under consideration, such as perceived 
threats to the Bulgarian nation by Greek, Macedonian, and Serbian identities. 
 
D. Method and Summary 
The structure of this comparative analysis will involve the evaluation of the 
constancy of religious, linguistic, and ethnic heterogeneity throughout the three 
historical periods of political transitions under review as a dependent variable with a 
specific focus on how in the third period, an intensified socialist, secularist agenda 
operated as a causal variable to explain intensified national identity-based conflict. 
I will do this by providing examples of the presence of religious, ethnic, and 
linguistic heterogeneity throughout all three periods.  I will also provide examples of 
how in the heterogeneous environment, minority groups were perceived by the 
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dominant ethnic groups during each period as bringing about economic and social 
contributions to the larger society.  Finally, I will identify the possible political 
motivations in the perceived necessity to greatly intensify homogenizing activities 
which were exhibited chiefly during the second half of the third period under review.  
While acknowledging that there were alternating homogenizing and heterogenizing 
influences throughout all three periods, it was really only during the latter period that 
the heterogeneity became intolerable.    
In summary of the chapters of the thesis, in this first chapter I have provided a 
general introduction to the research problem and a brief literature review situating this 
project within the existing literature.  
In the second chapter, I will explore the period of 1762-1877 within the context of 
the Ottoman Empire‘s dominion over the present-day territory of Bulgaria.  This 
second chapter is crucial because it marks the first of the three transitional periods 
under review.  This period represents the beginning of the nationalist identity 
construction as the Bulgarian Nationalist Revival Movement began co-opting and 
reframing key identity building blocks in order to begin redefining the Bulgarian 
nation.  
In the first section, brief mention of the relative local autonomy and millet system 
existing before the Bulgarian Nationalist Revival Movement will provide an important 
historical foundation for the examination of the latter part of the period under focus.  In 
the second section, the publication of Paiisi Hilendarski‘s A Slavonic- Bulgarian 
History will also be noted especially as his primary arguments for national revival were 
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not directed against Ottoman Turks and the usage of Turkish vernacular but against 
Greek Orthodox elites and the usage of Greek vernacular.  In addition, I will highlight 
the literacy and educational campaign of the nationalist movement to help elucidate that 
this was not initially an ―anti-Turkish‖ movement.  I will show how the educational 
campaigns coupled with the attempts to establish the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (over 
against the Greek Church) began heightening awareness of the role of religious 
differences in the area.  I will show by the latter part of this period, Bulgarian 
nationalists, such as Ivan Vazov in his novel Under the Yoke successfully utilized 
themes originally introduced by Hilendarski against the Greek Phanariots over a 
hundred years earlier, but reapplied them to an anti-Turkish/Islamic context, thereby 
reimagining the ―non-Bulgarian other‖ to be Muslim-Turkish.  Finally, I will briefly 
discuss the conflicts surrounding the April Uprising and how the Great Powers strove 
to maintain a balance of power in the region, often siding with ―Islamic Ottomans‖ 
until the time when Russia invaded the Balkans in the ―defense‖ of Balkan nationalist 
movements.  Focus will be given on how, again, these were initially political ―balance 
of power‖ issues and not inherently ethnic or religious conflicts. 
In the third chapter, the second period of 1878-1947 will be introduced as a second 
transitional period in which the attempts to frame fluctuations in Bulgarian national 
identity take on new directions that aren‘t just defined in religious or ethnic terms, but 
especially in geographic, linguistic, and political terms.  This section will highlight the 
role that redefined geographic boundaries played in developing a new conceptualization 
of Balkan identity under which competing claims on the same territory would prove to 
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be problematic for some time.  The role of deliberate language planning policies to 
bolster geographic claims will be noted.  In addition, I will examine the numerous 
struggles that Bulgaria had in establishing a centralized government during this period 
especially with regard to competing philosophies of European integration, agricultural 
vs. urban economic bases, plus lingering remnants of population shifts from the Balkan 
Wars.  Finally, I will highlight Aleko Konstantinov‘s creation of the fictional character 
of Bai Ganyu Balkanski as a Bulgarian archetype for the fluctuating Bulgarian identity 
during this period.  Bulgaria‘s most notable fictional character provides significant 
evidence of the reality of a ―constructed‖ Bulgarian identity in distinction over against 
Ivan Vazov‘s nationalist protagonists, who are stalwart anti-Turkish revolutionaries.  
Published within two years of one another, Konstantinov‘s and Vazov‘s novels 
represent the real time negotiations between the heterogenizing and homogenizing 
Bulgarian identity constructions occurring during this period.   
The fourth chapter focus on the final transitional period under review, namely, 
1947-1989.  This chapter is particularly important because it will demonstrate the 
radically alternative heterogenizing and homogenizing strategies employed by 
Communist leaders to facilitate the establishment of a socialist, secular state.  The early 
communist strategy encouraged the maintenance of heterogeneous religious, linguistic, 
and ethnic practice while the latter communist strategy disavowed that any such 
differences ever existed to the point of mobilizing the army to forcibly carry out the 
new strategy or assimilation.  This chapter will show that it was not the religious or 
ethnic differences that were the causal variable which explained the employment of 
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violent identity-based homogenization, but rather it is the belief that homogenization 
would speed up the achievement of socialist secularization. 
In the final chapter, the overall argument will be reviewed again in particular to 
demonstrate the fluidity and ease within which inhabitants of the geographic area of 
Bulgaria were able to resume relatively peaceful coexistence after periods of 
heightened political tensions.  In particular, the reinforcement of the times in which 
heterogeneity was maintained or reestablished subsequent to brief homogenizing 
influences will cement my contention that there is nothing inherent in the Bulgarian 
case to indicate that future generations of Bulgarians need revisit a violent 
homogenization or identity-based conflict on the scale witnessed in other parts of the 
world (Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Iraq, etc.).  The validity of generalizing the results of this 
thesis to understand other parts of the Balkans will be discussed in addition to 




Chapter Two: Throwing off “the Yoke”: Enlightened Bulgarian 
National Identity (1762 – 1877) 
 
A. Introduction: Pre-Ottoman and Ottoman Legacies 
Anthony Smith makes a useful contribution towards the understanding of the 
origins of nationalism, by pointing out the roles of 1) ―names,‖ 2) a ―belief or myth of 
common ancestry,‖ 3) ―historical memories,‖ and 4) a ―shared culture‖ that provide 
―ethnic categories‖ that nationalists later might utilize to construct a national identity 
during the modernist period through ―vernacular mobilization‖ (Smith 1993, 50-52, 
56).  While the next section certainly predates the period under review, it does provide 
an example of some of these ethnic categories that will be discussed later on in this 
chapter.  While Smith is correct in pointing to the co-option of existing prenational 
ethnic categories, it does not necessarily follow that these are in effect, primordial 
nations.  What is significant in looking at this early history is the degree to which even 
the construction of some of these early identity building blocks were shaped by political 
considerations vis-à-vis the greater regional political milieu. 
 
Early Background on Bulgarian Linguistic and Religious History 
Contemporary Bulgarians are the ethnic descendents of Slavic tribes who settled in 
Bulgaria in the 6th century AD and the proto-Bulgarians or Bulgars (mixed Turkic 
nomadic tribes from Central Asia) who also settled there in the 7th century AD.  The 
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integration between the two groups likely resulted in a mix of ethnicity, language, and 
culture.  The advanced political organization that enabled the foundation of the first 
united Bulgarian kingdom in 681 AD is a legacy attributed to the proto-Bulgarians, yet 
the linguistic heritage of the Slavs provided the starting point for the modern Bulgarian 
language (Crampton 1997, 8-10).  
The contemporary Bulgarian language is of Indo-European origin and is grouped in 
the South Slavonic (Slavic) language family together with Old Slavonic, Macedonian, 
Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian, and Slovenian.  It uses the Cyrillic phonetic script in its 
orthography.  Two Macedonian-born brothers, Methodius and Constantine-Cyril, are 
credited with the creation of the earliest forms of this script which enabled the Slavonic 
vernacular to be reduced to writing during the 9th century AD (Sanneh 1989, 215).   
The significance of the brothers‘ work must be placed within a broader political 
context.  First, their endeavor to create this script was at the behest of the Byzantine 
emperor who appointed the two as missionaries to Moravia in an apparent attempt to 
check the expansion of German influence into that region through Carolingian 
missionaries from the Roman church (Jelavich 1996a, 16).  The brothers already had 
translated portions of the Bible and an entire liturgy from Greek into the Slavonic 
vernacular utilizing their new script before they even left Constantinople for their 
mission (Sullivan 1954, 27).  The decision to make the Christian religious texts 
accessible in the vernacular had an extensive impact as it effectively enabled the 
foundations for what nationalists would later appeal in trying to wed ethnicity to 
religion as it allowed the ―transpos[ition of] Christianity into the terms of Slavic 
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culture.  The religion became synonymous with the project of Slavic self-identity 
(Sanneh 1989, 215).‖  The persistence of the brothers‘ attempts to make Christian 
literature available in Slavonic fostered acrimony between themselves and the German 
clergy who maintained ―the only languages permissible in the Eucharist were the three 
which were alleged to have been in Pilate‘s placard on the cross of Christ- Hebrew, 
Greek, and Latin (Latourette 1975, 308-309).‖ 
Although the brothers‘ mission to Moravia ultimately failed, it was not the end of 
their linguistic and religious influence.  While scholars debate whether the original 
alphabet the brothers created was the proto-Cyrillic or Glagolithic (Davis 1996, 
321;Jelavich 1996a, 16), the early texts that were produced through their early efforts 
facilitated the expansion of the Slavonic language throughout that region and 
eventually into Russia after 950 AD (Latourette 1975, 309). 
The work of Cyril and Methodius carried on through their disciples; in particular, 
Kliment Ohridski, who can claim credit for the ongoing development of the emerging 
Bulgarian language.  Kliment settled in Preslav, Bulgaria after the brothers‘ death along 
with other students of the brothers.  Preslav was the new Bulgarian capital established 
by King Boris I, who was the first Bulgarian ruler to convert to Christianity in 865.  
Kliment founded a school in Preslav which ―attracted over 3,000 students in its first 7 
years.‖  The center of Slavic Orthodox Christianity that was developing in Preslav 
produced a vast amount of literature in Old Slavonic which by that time had come to 
closely resemble the modern Cyrillic alphabet (Jelavich 1996a, 16). 
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Bulgarian nationalists will later refer to this time as a ―golden age‖ when the new 
Bulgarian identity seemed to solidify through the convergence of Slavic ethnicity, the 
Bulgarian language, and the Orthodox Christianity.  For the nationalist movement, 893 
AD is a pivotal marker as it is when Slavo-Bulgarian was declared the official language 
of both the Bulgarian Church and the nascent kingdom (Crampton 1997, 17).   
 
Ottoman Legacy 
However, this early period is not the only significant period in providing a legacy 
for the latter nationalist movement.  The Ottoman rule from 1373 to 1878 was the 
longest period of the territory comprising present day Bulgaria under foreign 
domination.  The interaction of ethnic, linguistic, and religious dynamics during this 
period make it the most significant historical experience in shaping Bulgarian national 
identity.   
Maria Todorova identifies two primary interpretations of the Ottoman legacy in the 
Balkans.  The first is that ―it was religiously, socially, institutionally, and even racially 
alien imposition on autochthonous Christian medieval societies.‖  The other is that of 
―complex symbiosis of Turkish, Islamic, and Byzantine/Balkan traditions‖ in which 
―several centuries of coexistence cannot but have produced a common legacy‖ or 
heterogeneity (Todorova 1997, 162-164).   
Todorova‘s second interpretation seems more likely especially when one considers 
the sometimes overlooked aspect of the Ottoman Sublime Porte to allow considerable 
freedom to Christians and other faith communities through the establishment of the 
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millet system.  The millet system was one in which administrative hierarchies were 
arranged by faith communities, so that in essence, Orthodox Christians appointed by 
the Muslim government would rule Orthodox Christians.  There were Jewish, Catholic, 
Armenian Christian, Orthodox, and Muslim millets.  By ―integrating Orthodox 
institutions into their system, the Ottoman government had the advantage of being able 
to incorporate a complete administrative network (Jelavich 1996a, 50).‖   
Mark Mazower details how the millet system reflected a comfortability with 
heterogeneous religious identities especially in village life where the distinctions 
between the religions were sometime blurred or perhaps were revealed to be 
subservient to a stricter adherence to magical folk rituals that perhaps predated either 
Christianity or Islam (Mazower 2002, 54-58).  ―In this shared world, devotional 
practice cut across theological divides not only in the realm of the supernatural, but also 
in the daily mundane life of the Ottoman world.  Islamic courts…were available for 
non-Muslims as well as for Muslims…who might utilize them as means of bypassing 
their own religious authorities (59).‖ 
However, over time, the system allowed competing allegiances to develop in the 
Orthodox Church as classes of administrative leadership began to centralize around the 
political structure of the Porte who began awarding leadership posts in the Christian 
millet administration to the highest bidder (Jelavich 1996a, 51-52).  By the 17th century 
a wealthy and corrupt emerging Greek leadership, called the Phanariots, began filling 
many of the Orthodox administrative posts in the Porte.  As the Phanariots grew in 
power, they began exerting a stronger Greek influence over the Orthodox millets across 
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the Ottoman Empire, which had actually retained quite a degree of independence before 
this time, even under a Muslim ultimate authority.  
 
B. National Revival Movement 
In returning to the Bulgarian case, interestingly enough, it was Greek power abuse 
and not Turkish power abuse that provide the impetus for the nationalist movement that 
eventually spread across Bulgaria (Jelavich 1996a, 53-57).  As Bulgarian priests began 
accommodating the Phanariots demands to diminish a distinctively Bulgarian identity 
among the Orthodox Church in Bulgaria, it was personalities like Paiisi Hilendarski and 
Vasil Levski (popularly known in Bulgaria as ―the Apostle of Freedom‖) who became 
what Anthony Smith would call ―vernacular mobilizers‖ for what would eventually 
become known as the National Revival Movement.  
 
Hilendarski’s Construction of a “Glorious” Slavic-Bulgarian Identity as a Precursor to the 
National Revival Movement 
A crucial point in Benedict Anderson‘s understanding of the factors contributing to 
the construction of national imaginaries is his view that ―print-as-commodity is the key 
to the generation of wholly new ideas of simultaneity (Anderson 1991, 37).‖  His point 
is particularly well demonstrated when one considers the role that the production in 
1762 of Bulgaria‘s earliest modern Bulgarian history, A Slavonic-Bulgarian History by 
the Christian Orthodox monk Paiisi Hilendarski
3
, played to signal the start of 
                                                     
3
 Popularly known as Otets Paiisi (Father Paiisi). 
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Bulgaria‘s National Revival Movement.  In his history, written while Bulgaria was still 
under Ottoman rule, Hilendarski laments that Bulgarians were beginning to speak 
Greek during the Ottoman rule and were forgetting their Bulgarian. 
O, Weak-minded Fools.  Are you ashamed to be called Bulgarian and don‘t 
read and speak your own language? … And for what reason, you stupid 
person, are you ashamed of your own people [only] to falter in a foreign 
tongue? (Hilendarski 1999, 20)- Author‘s translation. 
 
Although the linguistic threat that Hilendarski warned of is often confused in the 
popular mind to be Turkish and not Greek,4 the survival of the Bulgarian language in 
the midst of foreign linguistic influence is a strong factor that these earlier thought 
leaders of the movement toward national consciousness utilized to contribute to early 
Bulgarian imagined identities.  Hilendarski himself seemed to recognize this potential 
and so he embarked upon widespread travels throughout the region to publicize his 
handwritten manuscript throughout the 1760‘s.  He met several enthusiastic supporters 
along the way so that in the ensuing years, his handwritten manuscript was copied 
numerous times so that ―at least fifty copies are now extant  (Crampton 1997, 49).‖  It 
wasn‘t published into book form until 1844, but it had already become well known by 
this time (49).  Its print publication came at a unique timing to provide further 
background for the adoption of some of Hilendarski‘s ideas by the 19th century national 
movement leaders. 
                                                     
4
 From dozens of informal interview with Bulgarians as to the context of Hildendarski‘s famous quote 
conducted between 1998-2003. 
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One of Hilendarski‘s most significant contributions during the period is that he is 
the first modernist to reconnect the Bulgarian identity primarily to an ethnic self-
perception of a strong Slavic and Christian origin, 
From among all Slavic peoples the most glorious have been the Bulgarians, 
they were the first to call themselves Tsars, the first to have a patriarch, the 
first to be baptized (as Christians), and it was they who ruled over the largest 
amount of territory. Thus, from among all Slavic peoples, they were the 
strongest and the most honored.  The first Slavic saints cast forth their 
radiance from among the Bulgarian people and through the Bulgarian 
language, and for this foremost, have I written this history (Hilendarski 1999, 
20). – Author‘s translation. 
 
Parallels to the Other 19
th
 Century Nationalist Revolutions Across Europe 
Before examining more of the specific phases of the development of Bulgarian 
National Revival Movement in detail, it should also be noted that these developments 
in Bulgaria can be placed with the context of similar developments all across Europe 
during much of the 19th century.   
For example, German philosopher Johann Fichte, sounding a great deal like Paiisi 
Hilendarski, delivered a series of lectures in Berlin during the winter of 1807-1808 
entitled Addresses to the German Nation which were inspired by the French revolution 
of the late 18
th
 century,.  In  these addresses, Fichte outlines a system of educational 
measures which he is exhorting his fellow German citizens to undertake in which he 
outlines the importance of ethnic and linguistic differentiation of the German people.  
He passionately argues that this course will help advantage German ascendency over 
other European nations: 
In other words, the majority of the citizens must be educated to this sense of 
fatherland, and, in order that one may be sure of the majority, this education 
must be tried on all.  So with this is it now plainly and clearly proved, as was 
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likewise formerly promised, that education is the only possible means of 
saving German independence (Fichte 1922, 154).  
 
Hans Kohn, in his book Nationalism: Its Meaning and History,  also picks up on 
the unique role that national linguistic development plays during the 19
th
 century as he 
notes the interest of many in Germany who: 
set out to write grammars and compile dictionaries of their native tongues, to 
translate foreign works, to collect folksongs, to explore national antiquities, to 
do research in historical chronicles and archives.  All that was not done for its 
own sake but ad majorem nationis gloriam, to enhance the glory of one‘s own 
nation , and to establish its equality, if not its superiority in relation to its 
neighbors and to the more advanced nations (Kohn 1955, 46-47).  
 
Kohn also notes the influence that the 1848 establishment of the Second French 
Republic played on a further recasting of the nationalist ideals for Europe as he 
contends that nationalism quickly shifted from a liberal humanitarian ideal to a more 
―aggressive exclusivism‖ in which:  
This change of the character of nationalism in the middle of the nineteenth 
century occurred not only among the Germans but among all the people of 
Central and Eastern Europe.  The new spirit of violence, of glorification of 
heroic deeds, for the revival of a dim past and of its use as an inspiration al 
source – phenomena which came to darken the horizon of the twentieth 
century – was first noticeable in 1848 (Kohn 1955, 52). 
 
As we return to examining the Bulgarian case, it is striking how closely the 
National Revival Movement of the latter 19th century follows educational reimagining 
strategies advocated decades earlier by Hilendarski in Bulgaria and Fichte in Germany 
decades which became united with more aggressive developments described by Kohn. 
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Distinguishable Phases of the Revival Movement 
The Bulgarian National Revival movement (Balgarsko natsionalno vazrazhdane) 
was the genesis of a force that would ultimately result in Bulgaria‘s independence after 
nearly 500 years of foreign rule.  The ―Revival (vazrazhdane)‖ movement, as it was 
often commonly termed, went through three phases involving an educational literacy 
campaign, the reestablishment of the Slavonic liturgy in the Orthodox Church, and a 
discernible shift of the movement‘s focus away from anti-Greek sentiments to anti-
Turkish sentiments.   
 
Educational Campaign 
The first phase was an educational campaign to revive national Bulgarian identity 
consciousness.  By opening new schools, the leaders of the movement hoped to counter 
the Greek (not Turkish!) influence that had started to wear down the Bulgarian pride in 
its distinct ethnicity and language.  Hence, the schools taught Bulgarian language 
classes for the students.  As a corollary, the only textbooks available were primarily 
religious in nature, so the revival started to take on both a religious as well as linguistic 
characteristic (MacDermott 1986, 14-15).  
 
Slavonic Liturgy Reestablishment 
The second phase focused on the reestablishment of the Slavonic liturgy in the 
Bulgarian Orthodox Churches.  It also focused on ―securing appointments for 
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Bulgarian bishops [instead of Greek Phanariots] in dioceses with a predominately 
Bulgarian population (MacDermott 1986).‖ 
 
Shift from Anti-Greek to Anti-Turkish Sentiment 
As the movement began to grow as the Bulgarian identity was galvanized around 
ethnicity, language, and Orthodox Christianity, it entered the third phase which began 
shifting the focus from the Greek Phanariots to Turkish Porte.  Ivan Vazov, one of the 
educational reformers and later nationalist revolutionary was s a notable figure during 
this time.  Vazov, in his novel Pod Igoto (Under the Yoke), successfully utilized themes 
originally introduced by Hilendarski over a hundred years earlier, but reapplied them to 
an anti-Turkish/Islamic context (Vazov 2000).  Although published just after the end of 
this period in 1893,  Vazov‘s novel is evidence of the emerging interpretation of the 
Ottoman legacy which holds to the ―incompatibility between Christianity and Islam‖ as 
well as ―the incompatibility between the essentially nomadic civilization of the 
newcomers and the old urban and settled agrarian civilizations of the Balkans and the 
Near East (Todorova 1996, 46-47).‖   
What is equally important during this period is the role that the Bulgarian Orthodox 
Church is seen as having played in the preservation of the Bulgarian language during 
the Ottoman rule.  The circumstances seem to be a sort of recapitulation of the 
vernacular philosophy that mobilized the prodigious literature development of Cyril, 
Methodius, and Kliment.  This trend continues throughout the communist period and is 
evident in reviews of Bulgarian textbooks undertaken by John Georgeoff in 1966 
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(Georgeoff 1966, 443).  Contemporary popular expressions of these ideas also run 
along these lines: ―The early Christians helped us define ourselves as a nation and the 
later Christians helped us preserve our identity as a nation ―under the yoke.‖5 
 
C. National Liberation 
The April Uprising of 1876 
All of this national imagination of the Bulgarian identity as Slavic and Christian 
was increasingly highlighted as members of the Bulgarian National Liberation 
Movement in April 1876 planned a staged armed uprising in four different districts.  
This prompted an especially brutal response by the Bashi-bazouks in which hundreds 
of Bulgarians were slaughtered in an attempt to quash the uprising.  The Bashi-bazouks 
were Ottoman irregular soldiers who often didn‘t officially represent Ottoman policy 
but were instead recruited to be a stopgap measure while formal Ottoman troops were 
off waging war in Serbia.  This retaliation against the Bulgarian nationalists was 
quickly noticed on the international stage and although it had not been officially 
sanctioned by the Ottoman administration, it soon became viewed by many of the Great 
European powers as a threat to the carefully cultivated regional stability that it sought 
vis-à-vis the Turkish Porte.  It was also successfully utilized as a mobilizing influence 
in the nationalists‘ campaign against the Ottoman regime through the rehearsal of the 
horrors of the bloody massacres resulting from the suppression of the uprising 
(Crampton 1997, 80-83). 
                                                     
5
 From dozens of informal interviews with Bulgarians in the context of discussions about the legacy of 
the Ottoman Empire conducted between 1998-2003. 
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The Great Powers and the Russo-Turkish War 
The Great Powers, which were predominantly Christian in background, had long 
striven to maintain a balance of power in the region, often siding with ―Islamic 
Ottomans‖ who had still been viewed as a rather benevolent stabilizing presence in the 
region.  However, after the event of April 1876, the European powers began attempting 
to persuade the Ottoman Porte to institute a series of reforms under European 
supervision (Crampton 1997, 83).  These reforms were increasingly perceived by the 
Ottomans as unwelcome meddling by the Great Powers into Ottoman affairs and 
relations became further strained (Mazower 2002, 68).  Eventually, Russia invaded the 
Balkans in 1877 in ―defense‖ of the fledgling Balkan national movements and after a 
protracted fighting in Bulgaria, the San Stefano truce was signed in March of 1878 
which gave Bulgaria its initial independence from the Ottoman rule (Crampton 1997, 
83-85).  
It should be noted that there existed during this time period a movement known as 
Pan-Slavism which sought the incorporation of other ―Slav-speaking peoples, even 
against their will, into a greater Russia‖ with aspirations of eventual Russian world 
domination.  Pan-Slavism assumed ethnic and linguistic similarities ―resulted in an 
affinity of civilization and political ideology and in a desire for union (Kohn 1955, 71-
72).‖  Barbara Jelavich asserts that while Pan-Slavism was a ―fad‖ Russia clearly was 
able to greatly influence Balkans national boundary shaping as it Pan-Slavism drew 
many adherents in the 1870‘s (Jelavich 1996a, 353-355).  
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Thus, it is not surprising that Britain, the Hapsburgs, Greece, Romania, and Serbia 
were greatly alarmed at the size of the geographic boundaries of San Stefano Bulgaria 
fearing increased Russian presence that might further upset the balance of power for 
Central Europe (Jelavich 1996a, 358-361).  As a result, Britain and Austria-Hungary 
―demanded that the boundaries be redrawn‖ in July 1878 under the Treaty of Berlin 
which was slightly larger than a third of the geographic boundaries promised under the 
San Stefano agreement (Crampton 1997, 85-86).  This theme of Bulgarian identity in 
relation to the Great Powers will be revisited in more detail in chapter three.  However, 
it should be clear that the Treaty of Berlin provided for a geographically bounded 
Bulgaria which initially had everything to do with balance of power issues and very 
little to do with inherently ethnic or religious patterns of population distribution. 
 
D. Conclusions 
This chapter has provided a brief overview of the pre-Ottoman and Ottoman 
legacies of ethnic, linguistic, and religious categories which have been utilized by 
nationalist vernacular mobilizers during the period of 1762-1878 to imagine a particular 
type of Bulgarian identity that is perceived to be Slavonic and Orthodox Christian.  
However, as was also demonstrated, the stages by which this Bulgarian imaginary was 
constructed clearly showed that there is not necessarily a natural state of ―ethnic 
category‖ that could be attributed to Bulgaria apart from the mediating influences of 
political factors throughout history which have sought to define this identity over and 
against another.  While initially these political factors sought differentiation over 
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against Roman Catholic and Greek Orthodox Christian influences, this identity only 
much later came to be defined in more stereotypical terms of the modern binary 
opposition of Christian vs. Muslim.  These developments also found clear parallels in 
the nationalist movement occurring during the 19
th
 century in Europe as well as the 
Pan-Slavism ambitions of Russia. 
Interestingly enough, as Mazower notes in discussing the following quote from a 
Bulgarian memoir written in the 1870‘s, during the decade in which the April Uprising 
and the Russo-Turkish Wars occurred, while ―the differences between Muslim and 
Christian were not hidden and the two communities lived side by side‖ the daily 
interactions were not ―characterized by tension or conflict (Mazower 2002, 66).‖ 
Turks and Bulgarians got on well together.  The women of a village quarter 
bordering on Turkish houses mixed with the Turkish women in a neighborly 
way, while the children played with the little Turks as with their own 
playmates.  The Turkish women and children spoke Bulgarian quite well and 
the Bulgarians, like their children, managed to get by in Turkish, the result 
being a sort of mixed patois.  Those Turks who worked at Bulgarian houses 
were accepted as close friends…. We were used to the Turks.  We Bulgarians 
lived our own life, to be sure, we had our own dress, our own customs and 
stuck to our own faith, while they lived another way, had other customs and 
other costume, their faith was different too.  But all this we took as being in 
the order of things (Warriner 1965).  
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Chapter Three: Identity Crisis in the Early 20th Century: 
Schizophrenic Bulgarian Nationalism (1878 – 1947) 
 
A. Introduction 
This chapter will frame the flux in Bulgarian identity that occurred during this 
period not only in ethnic and religious terms, but in geographic, linguistic, and political 
terms.  It was during this period that Bulgarians found themselves seeking to imagine 
their identity while at the same time vacillating between a stronger Western orientation 
as well as renewed Eastern focus.  While fledgling steps were made towards a Western-
style government that recognized the historical Bulgarian ethno-religious history, 
internal political inexperience and upheaval, two Balkan Wars, and both World Wars 
never allowed a stable modern national government to develop.  The Bulgarian 
nationalist leaders who had aspired to a greater European or Western identity 
subsequently found themselves to be in a kind of no-man‘s land between the East and 
West and between Christendom and Islam, due to perceptions of betrayal by the Great 
Powers, especially regarding the redrawing of the San Stefano boundaries as discussed 
in the previous chapter.   
 
B. Bulgarian identity construction vis-à-vis the Great Powers 
Geographical Identity Imaginaries vis-à-vis Europe 
Throughout this period, and especially after the Balkan Wars, it would become 
increasingly clear that Europe was beginning to understand the region as ―the Balkans‖ 
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with something more than just a geographic association.  The term itself became 
―loaded with negative connotations – of violence, savagery, primitivism – to an extent 
which is hard to find a parallel (Mazower 2002, xxvii-xxviii).‖  The region represented 
―an intermediate culture zone between Europe and Asia – in Europe but not of it 
(xxxiv).‖ Maria Todorova develops the history of the shifting concept of geographic 
region to constructed regional identity in her book, Imagining the Balkans.  She claims 
that the entire region bears the brunt of Europe‘s attempts to come to terms with its own 
identity vis-à-vis its Muslim neighbors.  
By being geographically inextricable from Europe, yet culturally constructed 
as ―the other‖ within, the Balkans have …absorb[ed] a number of externalized 
political, ideological, and cultural frustrations stemming from tensions and 
contradictions inherent to the regions and societies outside [author‘s 
emphasis] the Balkans (Todorova 1997, 188).   
 
This is nowhere more evident in Bulgaria during this period as the nationalist 
movement realizes that while the movement thought it was preparing for Bulgaria‘s 
acceptance into Europe, the realization comes that the Great Powers had exploited 
Bulgaria for their own balance of power purposes through the drafting of the Treaty of 
Berlin.  While this floundering sense of cultural displacement that set in was never 
resolved in the decades between Ottoman and Communist rule, it did not prevent the 
nationalists from seeking to expand the construction of Bulgarian national identity to be 
commensurate with that of San Stefano‘s geographic borders.  
After Bulgaria's liberation in 1878, as was mentioned above in chapter two, the 
Great Powers heavily shaped the geographic boundaries of Bulgaria in the redrafting of 
the San Stefano borders to the Treaty of Berlin borders.  This redrafting of Bulgaria‘s 
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borders reduced the Treaty of Berlin borders to 37.5% of its San Stefano treaty borders.  
For those in the nationalist movement ―the real Bulgaria remained that of San Stefano.  
The new Bulgarian state was to enter into life with a ready-made programme for 
territorial expansion and a burning sense of the injustice meted out to it by the great 
powers (Crampton 1997, 85).‖ 
Bulgaria‘s Tûrnovo Constitution of 1878 was heavily shaped by German, Russian 
and Serbian political influence.  It called for executive powers to be centralized with a 
prince, who must be of the Orthodox faith.  It defined very clear connections between 
the Bulgarian State and the Orthodox Church (Crampton 1997, 87-91).  However, 
finding a new monarch with royal lineage that was also a professing Orthodox 
Christian proved to be a problem, since, according to stipulations from the Treaty of 
Berlin, the candidates were not allowed to be from Russian descent (Neuburger 2004, 
35).  The constitution was changed to allow an exemption from the Orthodoxy clause 
for their new ruler, the German prince Alexander Battenberg (Crampton 1997, 87-91).   
Without any practical experience of self-determination over the preceding 500 
years, balancing the varied interests of the rest of Europe and Russia proved to be too 
much for the new ruler who was deposed after only seven years in Bulgaria.  
Vacillating between the East and West and conservative and liberal political pressures, 
Bulgarian politicians once again went on the search for a Western monarch interested 
in the job.  They found another willing German candidate in Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-
Coburg-Gotha, as long as he had assurances that Russia would agree not to play too 
heavy of hand in Bulgarian politics (Crampton 1997, 103-106).  
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The First Balkan War 
Remarkably, it was actually a Great Power balance of power strategy which led 
Russia to suggest in 1912 to the Balkan countries that they form a defensive Balkan 
League which Russia hoped would help provide additional leverage in the region to 
mitigate the undue influence of Austria.  Surprisingly, however, Russia underestimated 
the political imaginations of the greater Balkan countries as the Balkan League quickly 
sets its sight on Turkey and quickly secured the final liberation of South Balkan lands 
from the vestiges of Ottoman dominion during the first Balkan War (Mazower 2002, 
105).  
 
Trial and Error: Creating New Political Identities 
One notable feature during this transitional period from 1878-1947 is that in 
addition to external pressures facing Bulgarian national ambitions, Bulgaria had 
significant problems in establishing a stable national government during this period.  
This is particularly salient with regards to attempting to grapple with the society being 
in significant upheaval.  This societal upheaval resulted from competing philosophies 
of European integration, shifting agricultural vs. urban economic bases, multiple 
governments coming into power, after-effects of the Balkan Wars, as well as the effects 
of both World War I and World War II.    
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Geographical Identity Imaginaries vis-à-vis Other Balkan States  
Language planning 
Once the San Stefano geographical boundaries were envisaged, albeit only briefly, 
the political influences of how Bulgarian national identity would continue to be 
imagined took on a whole new meaning.  In this section, we turn our attention to 
deliberate sociolinguistic strategies employed by linguists and politicians to grapple 
with the continued imaginary national identity.  In a fascinating analysis, Rossitza 
Guentcheva provides a thorough overview of the ―orthographic reform‖ debates that 
began in post-Ottoman Bulgaria and intermittently continued over the next century in 
the context of political controversy over the boundaries of language and national space 
(Guentcheva 1999, 356-358).  The debate was ―conditioned by the struggle over 
territories while both Bulgaria and Serbia cited the population‘s language as a key 
evidence for supporting their claims.‖   
She identifies two scholarly principles around which the debate was framed.   The 
first was a linguistic ―phonetic‖ principle being driven by the ―pro-reformers,‖ who 
wanted to simplify Bulgarian orthography through the elimination of letters inherited 
through Old Bulgarian  (Old Church Slavonic) but no longer uniformly pronounced in 
speech, such as jers, big jus, and jat.  In opposition to this first view was a 
sociopolitical view known as the ―etymological‖ principle being endorsed by the ―anti-
reformers‖ who wanted to preserve the traditional orthography (Guentcheva 1999, 
358).  Many of the nationalist elites, during the early years after Bulgarian liberation 
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from Ottoman rule, held a primordialist view which ―shared the Herdian conviction that 
language is an objective marker of national belonging (Guentcheva 1999, 356).‖  
This argument was crucial to the national imaginary because linguistic reform 
would eliminate antiquated forms which would otherwise lend credibility to the view 
that Macedonians living in the greater reaches of San Stefano Bulgaria were actually 
Bulgarian nationals.  On the other hand, by pushing through the orthographic reforms, 
the changes could actually help unify the practice of contemporary speech of 
Bulgarians found living in the Treaty of Berlin Bulgaria, yet it would also create new 
affinities with the Serbian language which might bolster eventual claims by Serbia over 
some of the physical geography of Bulgaria.  Guentcheva convincingly chronicles the 
linguistic reasoning behind ultimately sociopolitical approaches that alternatively 
recognized, then denied, then recognized again a distinct Macedonian language and 
nationality both outside and within the recognized Bulgarian geographic boundaries of 
the day.  As the political landscapes changed, especially before and after the first and 
second Balkan Wars, so did the official language politics which were believed to favor 
Bulgaria‘s positioning vis-à-vis the Macedonian question.  Even the Bulgarian 
parliament took an active role in deciding these policies (Guentcheva 1999, 361-36).  
Guentcheva  concludes that the future trend in East South Slavic languages will be to 
blend ―grammatical and political imperatives‖ so that ―orthography will be more about 
symbolic demarcation than about phonemics‖ thus demonstrating the active national 




The Second Balkan War 
After tasting collective success in its joint campaign with fellow Balkan League 
countries in its attacks on the Ottoman Turks in the first Balkan War, Bulgaria found its 
own independent confidence bolstered as it attacked its former allies in attempts to 
recapture more of its claims to the San Stefano borders.  This second Balkan War ended 
badly for the Bulgarians who also found themselves losing some of their recently 
reclaimed geographic borders in compensation for its aggression (Crampton 1997, 135-
141). 
 
 “Bai Ganyu” as Metaphor for Bulgarian Identity Crisis vs. Vazov’s Ognyanov & Stomatov 
Bulgaria‘s literature during this time captures the awkwardness of Bulgarian 
attempts to come to grips with its place in a world very different from that under 
Ottoman rule (Konstantinov 1992).  According to Bulgarian literary critic Svetlozar 
Igov in his introduction to Aleko Konstantinov‘s novel featuring the Bulgarian 
caricature of fictional Bai Ganyu, Konstantinov captured the essence of Bulgarian 
―national, social, and philosophical-historical problems of the Bulgarian … ‗road 
towards Europe  (Konstantinov 1999, 5).‘‖   
This is evident from the first moment of our introduction to the character in the 
opening passage,  
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They helped Bai Ganyu take off  his Turkish cloak, and he slipped himself 
into a Belgian mantle – and everyone exclaimed that Bai Ganyu was already a 
complete European (Konstantinov 1999, 17) – Author‘s translation. 
 
Todorova also confirms the unique role that Konstantinov‘s character plays in 
helping us to understand the self-analytical national lens through which Bulgarian 
identity is viewed.  Her elucidation of the difficulties in understanding how one should 
approach understanding Bai Ganyu parallels in a microcosm the problems the 
Bulgarian nation has in defining itself in either ethnic or social terms with the 
difference being,  
Whether Bay Ganyo should be analyzed as a biological, racial, national, 
cultural, civilizational type or as a distinctive sociohistorical type without an 
indispensable ethnic/national specificity, belonging to a definite transitional 
period in the development of backward societies (Todorova 1997, 39). 
 
This point remains open to interpretation as evidenced by an amusing passage in the 
1895 fictional chronology of Bai Ganyu dropping in unannounced on the European 
notables of his day.  In this passage we see a clear description of the on the spot 
Bulgarian imaginary of Bai Ganyu Balkanski as he symbolically and literally, in name, 
represents the Balkan period under review. 
Lunch is ready.  They move into the dining room and sit around the table… 
Bai Ganyu, before beginning to eat, begins the motions to make the sign of the 
cross, but half crosses himself and half begins to giggle, as if to show his hosts 
that he is not one of the simple folk or a deep believer, yet at the same time 
indicating it‘s not so bad (with the devil we do great, but what little difficulty 
it is to also invite the Lord‘s blessing- just in case).  ―I‘m a liberal, from a 
liberal party,‖ he explains.  ―It‘s no big deal to submit to a little ‗crossing of 
oneself‘, it‘s not so bad, we‘re human…. Oh, what‘s that? Soup?  Oh, I love 
soup.  Chorba [Turkish name for soup] is Turkish food.  We mostly eat soup 
nowadays.  Oops, pardon, excuse me.  I spilled some all over your tablecloth.  




Over and against Konstantinov‘s literary creation of Bai Ganyu, we can also point 
to Ivan Vazov‘s novel, Pod Igoto (Under the Yoke), published just two years before 
Konstantinov‘s first Bai Ganyu stories.  In Vazov‘s novel, Bulgarian heroes Ognyanov 
and Stomatov recapitulate the ideas and themes of the Bulgarian Nationalist Revival 
Movement in graphic form as they valiantly and violently seek to defend the Bulgarian 
national homeland against Vazov‘s portrayal of Turks which Neuburger laments are 
―unequivocally cruel, if not bestial, alien interloper[s], occupying and preying on 
essentially ‗Bulgarian‘ cultural and material belongings.‖   Interestingly enough in 
addition to his clear anti-Turkish sentiment, Vazov also critiques European Bulgarian 
characters who are vilified for their collaboration with the Turks rather than connecting 
with the national Bulgarian (Neuburger 2004, 38;Vazov 2000).   
It should also be noted that Ivan Vazov took an active role himself in the early 
orthographic reform debates highlighted above advocating for the ―etymological‖ 
principle in which he fears the loss of political advantage by getting rid one of the 
historical letters big jus (Guentcheva 1999, 359). 
As Todorova claims when discussing her two views of Ottoman legacy perception 
vs. continuity, ―these two interpretations of the Ottoman legacy are not merely possible 
scholarly reconstructions; they actually existed side by side throughout the Ottoman 
period (Todorova 1997, 166).‖  The fact that Ivan Vazov, representing Todorov‘s 
perception view, remains popularly known as Bulgaria‘s most celebrated writer as well 
as the fact that Bai Ganyu, representing Todorova‘s ―continuity‖ view is popularly 
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known as Bulgaria‘s most famous fiction creation, should only highlight the reality that 
this period is clearly one of significant identity imaginary creation and negotiation. 
 
C. Conclusions 
In chapter two, it was demonstrated that the earliest constructions of modernist 
national Bulgarian identity in the 18th and 19th centuries were shaped by political 
maneuvering and not as is commonly assumed to arise from ethnic or religious 
oppositions of primordial tensions between Bulgarian Christians vs. Turkish Muslims. 
In this chapter, it was demonstrated that heterogenizing and homogenizing 
imaginaries of the late 19th and early 20th centuries were often negotiated through 
Bulgaria‘s fledgling attempts to define and differentiate itself not only from its Ottoman 
past but its uneasy relationships with the competing interests of the Great Powers.  In 
particular the repartitioning of Bulgaria‘s geographic territory which shrank it from its 
borders negotiated by Russia under the San Stefano Treaty to the renegotiated borders 
under the Treaty of Berlin, left some of the nationalist elites struggling to redefine 
themselves over against the manipulations of the West which it aspired to join and the 
East which it desired to leave behind (Neuburger 2004, 35).  This occurred through 
active language planning strategies, popularized fiction, and stops and starts for many 
attempts at establishing a stable national government. 
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Chapter Four: Socialist Secularization: Progressive 
Aggression in Bulgarian Nationalism (1947 – 1989) 
 
A. Introduction 
In September 1944, the Bulgarian Communist Party (alternatively known as the 
Bulgarian Workers Party during this time) seized power during the chaos ensuing in the 
latter months of World War II as Bulgaria switched allegiances from the Axis powers 
to the Allies.  For the next three years, the Communists gradually consolidated 
complete domination over state institutions as they eliminated ideological opposition by 
executing many former government members as well as members of the intelligentsia 
by scapegoating them as German collaborators (Crampton 1997, 180-189).   
During these early years of Communist rule in Bulgaria, the regime employed 
strategies which not only tolerated but actively encouraged the maintenance of 
heterogeneous religious, linguistic, and ethnic practices which were believed would 
help foster a greater sense of solidarity within a greater Bulgarian socialist nation 
defined more on civic nationalist terms rather than ethnic nationalist terms.  Therefore, 
it was relatively surprising when the strategy later shifted and the Communists 
disavowed that any such ethnic differences ever existed.  This latter strategy eventually 
employed aggressive tactics such as mobilizing the army to forcibly carry out the new 
strategy of assimilating the ethnic Turks.   
This chapter will illustrate the political realities of both the heterogenizing and 
homogenizing strategies employed under Communism to facilitate the establishment of 
43 
a socialist nation and thus show that it is not the religious or ethnic differences 
themselves which explain the employment of violent identity-based homogenization, 
but rather it is the belief that homogenization will speed up the achievement of socialist 
secularization. 
 
B. Relative Tolerance: Co-opting Muslim Identities (1947 – 1957) 
The early Communist period following the end of WWII was a significant time of 
communist identity-shaping in Bulgaria.  The 1947 Bulgarian Constitution, drafted 
under BCP chair Georgi Dimitrov, stated that ―National minorities are entitled to be 
taught in their mother tongue and develop their national culture (Petkova 2002, 42).‖  
This provision proved to be not only theoretical but practical as well.  Borrowing from 
the Soviet socialist model in which ―national cultures were used as vehicles for 
advancing Communist modernization,‖ the BCP invested substantially into creating 
secularized Turkish schools, media outlets, and cultural bodies among the illiterate 
population (Neuburger 2004, 63).   
While attempting to highlight class commonalities between Bulgarian and Turkish 
workers in an ideal ―socialist nation (Neuburger 2004, 56),‖ it should be noted that the 
Communists probably never intended this modernization strategy to foster a greater 
sense of Turkish identity consciousness.   However, this period can be categorized as a 
time when ethnic Turks experienced a high degree of stable cultural and religious 
freedom of expression.  In fact, it is remarkable that Turkish Muslim clergy could even 
be said to have fared much better during the early years of Bulgarian Communism than 
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their ethnic Bulgarian Christian Catholic or Protestant clergy counterparts, many of 
whom were executed or imprisoned in an attempt to stamp out organized religion 
(Petkova 2002, 43). 
It should also be noted that in 1950-51, there was a mass emigration from Bulgaria 
to Turkey of around 150,000 Turks.  This most likely stemmed from changing 
economic realities as thousands in the Turkish farming communities struggled to adjust 
to the collectivization of their farms.  Thus this early migration is due more to 
economic hardships than to any demonstrable ethnic persecution unique to the Turks 
(Brubaker 1995, 203-205;Hopken 1997, 67).   
 
C. “Zhivkov’s Theses” and Bulgaria’s “Great Leap Forward” (1957-1969) 
What happened to change the status quo of this tolerant modernizing strategy of the 
early Communist period?  This section will highlight the evolution and intensification 
of the homogenizing process based upon growing anxiety that the Muslim minorities‘ 
relative autonomy was inhibiting true socialist assimilation and negatively impacting 
national economic progress.  Particular care will be paid to demonstrate Todor 
Zhivkov‘s economic and political motivations as opposed to the presence of inherent 
religious or ethnic tensions existing among the various ethnic groups. 
Todor Zhivkov, who began taking a more central role among the Communist party 
elites after becoming party secretary in 1954, favored a more rapid urbanization and 
collectivization of agricultural lands than the slower pace established by his 
predecessors.  His attempts to rapidly industrialize and modernize Bulgarian industry 
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and agriculture in the late 1950‘s and early 1960‘s precipitated significant lifestyle 
changes in rural and village life around Bulgaria.  By 1958, collective farms in Bulgaria 
were reformed and expanded in size reducing the total number from 3,450 to 932 
(Crampton 1997, 196).  This, in turn, profoundly affected the status of the 
predominantly rural Muslim workers engaged in agricultural production.   
Zhivkov modeled this period of economic expansion on Mao Tse-tung‘s ―Great 
Leap Forward,‖ even adopting the terminology (Jelavich 1996b, 366-367).  While 
Bulgaria‘s ―Great Leap Forward‖ ultimately was seen to be a failure, Zhivkov became 
premier in addition to party chief by 1962 thereby solidifying his control over the 
Bulgarian state with the full blessings of Krushchev who had been maligning 
Zhivkov‘s predecessor, Vulko Chervenkov since 1956 (366-367).  Zhivkov‘s early 
contributions to rapid economic expansion, however, clearly had immediate 
implications for the BCP‘s strategies of dealing with the ethnic minorities.  The 
dawning realization was that if economic expansion must occur more rapidly, then the 
strengthening of a socialist consciousness must also occur more rapidly if the former 
could be expected to succeed, especially in the rural areas most actively impacted by 
the economic changes.   
As Communist values across Bulgaria became more established elsewhere, it 
became clearer that the daily life (bit) of Turks and Pomaks in Bulgaria was remaining 
too closely associated with older cultural traditions (often religious) and not matching 
up to a Bulgarian socialist ideal (Neuburger 2004, 58,73).  It also was clear to some 
Communist leaders that the educational policies had helped forge a stronger Turkish 
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identity than it had a ―socialist consciousness‖ and were thus perceived to be a ―failure‖ 
requiring a change in strategy (Neuburger 2004, 72).‖  Thus the gradual shift in the 
government‘s policy toward the Turkish minority was realized beginning with the 
merger of Turkish schools with Bulgarian ones in 1958 and gradually the cessation of 
all formal education in the Turkish language by the 1970‘s (Simsir 1988, 197).  While 
there was no active action against utilization of the Turkish language itself, it was 
believed that without media or educational support for Turkish, its usage would 
decrease (Neuburger 2004, 72). 
 
D. The “Inclusion” and “Rebirth” of Bulgarian Muslims (1970’s, 1984-
1989) 
A more radical policy shift occurred in the 1970s as Todor Zhivkov‘s government 
began to more actively and aggressively reimagine the parameters of acceptable 
identity definitions.  There have been several explanations offered as to why the BCP 
became more aggressive in pursuing an additional incremental change in the strategy 
including: 1) the government‘s wariness of the growing demographic disparity 
(Crampton 1997, 210),  2) an increasing perception of the incompatibility of Turkish 
traditional religious culture to be amenable to secular socialist progress (Neuburger 
2004, 73), 3) the Turkish and Greek conflicts in Cyprus which might provide 
precedence for an analogous conflict in Bulgaria among Turkish nationalists (Bojkov 
2004, 355), or 4) an attempt to further centralize power that seemed suddenly 
achievable due to the elimination of previous threats to Zhivkov‘s rule (Dimitrov 2000, 
9-10).  Quite possibly it was a combination of the above factors, but moreover, it 
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clearly seems to be the result of political machinations rather than a response to actual 
threats or tensions present among the minorities themselves. 
This renewed process was initially termed ―inclusion (priobsthavane)‖ and it was 
hoped that the socialist secularization of Bulgaria might foster the creation of a melting 
pot, ultimately mixing the majority ethnic Bulgarians together with the Turk and 
Pomak minorities.  It included another attempt at actively reeducating the minority 
groups according to a more ideological national Bulgarian identity.  As Milena Mahon 
notes the vacillating heterogenizing and homogenizing strategies pursued by the 
government resulted in confusion as to whether the reeducation should involve 
opposing Islamic religious identity or include cultural traditions as well.   
‗Since the religion was considered the most obvious mark of their distinct 
nationality it was targeted first and its cultural expressions were labeled as 
‗Turkish bourgeouis nationalism‘ thus calling into question Turkish ‗loyalty to 
the Bulgarian state; practicing Turkish-Muslim cultural habits indicated 
disloyalty (Mahon 1999, 157).‘ 
 
 
As a part of this process, the Bulgarian constitution was noticeably modified in 
1971 to describe the minority ethnic groups as citizens of ―non-Bulgarian extraction.‖  
Another part of this early process included replacing the term ―Turk‖ with the term 
―Muslim Bulgarian‖ as well as eventually changing the Arabic names of Bulgarian-
speaking Muslims (Pomaks) to Slavic equivalents (Hopken 1997, 69).  In addition, 
deliberate strategies to curtail Muslim religious practices during this time were also put 
in place along with the discouragement of speaking Turkish (Petkova 2002, 47).  
Despite the Bulgarian government‘s claims of a successful policy of ―inclusion‖ that 
was resulting in ―a single ethnic type and … nearing complete homogeneity,‖ the 
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policy actually had little impact on Turkish religious, cultural, and linguistic practice 
(Hopken 1997, 69). 
This government instigated homogenizing process was notably and aggressively 
intensified in late 1984 and 1985 as the government embarked on what it called the 
―rebirth/revival process (vazroditelen/ vazrazhdane protses)‖ as it was officially 
termed.  The actual terminology employed by the Communists deliberately evokes the 
language of 19
th
 century Bulgarian National Revival movement described above in 
chapter two.  According to government documents, this Turkish rebirth/revival was 
intended to aid in ―the recovery of a Bulgarian self-consciousness chiefly for the 
definitive integration [of the Turks] into the Bulgarian nation (Alp 1988, 170).‖   
This process was accomplished by requiring Bulgarian Turks to ―voluntarily‖ fill 
out petitions to change their own names to Slavic equivalent, a sample of which is 
provided below in which the petitioner voluntarily asks to be reregistered as an ethnic 
Bulgarian with words provided for the petitioner on pre-printed applications: 
On the basis of the accompanying petition and in accordance with the state 
regulations for maintaining registries of resident status as published in the 
1970 issue, edition no. 2 of the IZVESTIE newspaper, we request to be 
included in the registry of BULGARIAN nationals and to change our names 
as follows... (Alp 1988, 170) – Author‘s translation. 
 
In December 1984 alone, 233,310 Bulgarian Turks had their names changed in the 
Kurdzhali region.  The success of this experiment led to a secret Politburo decision to 
carry this out for the whole country (Nedelcheva 2004, 183).  Those unwilling to 
submit to this name change lost their jobs or were forced at the threat of violence to 
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comply with the name change. One individual, Hikmet Halid Mehmet, recounted his 
experience below: 
The police came with guns, and we were gathered in the center of town.   
They‘d say, ‗What name do you want?‘ I‘d say, ‗I don‘t want a new name.‘  
They‘d say, ‗What‘s your name?‘ I‘d say ‗Hikmet.‘  
They‘d say ‗Hikmet…OK, now you‘re Hristo (i.e. Christ).‘ And they‘d hold 
your hand and force you to write your new name (Malcomson 1993, 49).  
 
It is estimated that thousands  of those resisting were imprisoned or sent to labor 
camps, including around 1500 sent to internal exile on the island of Belene on the 
Danube River (Helsinki Watch Report 1986, 11).  The threat of internal exile was 
clearly hinted at in Politburo member Stanko Todorov‘s speech of 28 March 1985 in 
which he expressed that: 
those who ‗do not wish to live in their native towns and villages can move 
out.‘  For cases of this kind, he added, instructions have been give to the 
appropriate Bulgarian organs, to ensure speedy removal (reportedly within 
hours), ‗not to Turkey but to other regions of Bulgaria, where these people 
will be able to live peacefully and happily (Amnesty International 1986, 14).‘ 
 
Bulgarian Interior Minister Dimitar Stoyanov is also quoted during the time as 
saying: 
All our fellow countrymen who reverted to their Bulgarian names are 
Bulgarians.  They are the bone of the bone and the flesh of the flesh of the 
Bulgarian nation; although the Bulgarian national consciousness of some  
of them might still be blurred, they are the same Bulgarian flesh and blood;  
they are children of the Bulgarian nation; they were forcibly torn away and  
now they are coming back home.  There are no Turks in Bulgaria.   
The issue is closed (Bell 1999, 24).‖ 
 
In addition to the forced changing of one‘s own name and those of his immediate 
family members, the names of the Muslim dead were also changed posthumously and 
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Turks could be fined for not covering over the old names on their ancestor‘s 
tombstones (Korkud 1986, 41).  Fines were also levied for the use of Turkish in public, 
for wearing Turkish or Muslim dress, and for carrying out Muslim rituals such as 
circumcision or burial customs (Alp 1988, 203; Amnesty International 1986, 18; 
Petkova 2002, 47).  Turkish folk music was also banned (Petkova 2002, 47).  
Georgi Fotev argues that the impetus for these changes was to attempt to create 
―unified civil rituals‖ under which the influence of all religions would be eventually 
eliminated as ―a prerequisite to the final aim - the consolidation of the Bulgarian 
socialist consciousness (Fotev 1999, 39).‖ 
 
E. The Great Excursion and the Collapse of the Homogenization 
Experiment (1989) 
Although this initial phase of forced assimilation was completed in 1985, a new 
wave of protests by the ethnic Turks over their treatment by the government began at 
the end of March 1989 in anticipation of the CSCE Paris Conference on the Human 
Dimension (Nedelcheva 2004, 185).  By early May, as thousands protested in Kliment, 
the Bulgarian police surrounded and beat protesters, killing some. The next day in the 
village of Todor Ikonomovo at a wedding, soldiers fired into the crowd and killed 
several and wounded dozens.  These orchestrated protests, coinciding as they did with 
the Paris human rights meetings, brought a lot of media attention to the continued 
ethnic discrimination facing Turks in Bulgaria. 
Turkey, in particular, strengthened its repeated denouncements of the situation 
facing Bulgarian Turks. On May 27th of 1989, apparently as a result of the increased 
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international attention being focused on the protests, Todor Zhivkov challenged Turkey 
to open its border with Bulgaria and publicly offered tourist visas to any Bulgarian 
citizen who wished to visit or live in Turkey.  This can only be interpreted as a tacit 
admission of the specious logic espoused during the rebirth campaign, for why would 
―ethnic Bulgarians‖ want to go live in Turkey spontaneously?  The BCP apparently did 
not expect the dramatic results that occurred which included the exodus of 369,839 
ethnic Turks between May and September when Turkey closed its own border as it was 
unable to handle the tides of incoming Bulgarian Turks.  In what became known as 
―The Great Excursion,‖ in four months 43% of the total Turkish population of Bulgaria 
(around 850,000 at the time) had left the country (Vasileva 1992, 347-349).  While 
there is clear evidence that the Bulgarian authorities forcibly deported many Turks 
during the early part of this process, many others took advantage of the new freedom to 
escape the threat of violence or to seek better economic alternatives in Turkey (Helsinki 
Watch Report 1989, 27-38). 
In the weeks following the exodus of such a large percentage of the Bulgarian 
Turks, it became apparent that several factors made the continuation of the 
revival/rebirth policy no longer in the interest of the Bulgarian government. First of all, 
the reality of thousands of Bulgarian Turkish ―tourists‖ waiting to cross with household 
belongings into Turkey drew a lot more attention and media coverage than the 
Bulgarian government anticipated as outcries by human rights organizations such as the 
Helsinki Watch Committee and Amnesty International soon were echoing from the 
Turkish and American media as well as attracting the notice of the CSCE in Europe 
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(Atanassova 1999).  These negative portrayals greatly hampered Bulgaria‘s ability to 
continue to spin its version of a voluntary self-awareness of ethnic revival to an 
increasingly skeptical world. 
Finally, the economic instability exacerbated by the unanticipated loss of an 
estimated one third of Bulgaria‘s agricultural workforce, brought the government 
quickly to its senses.  The internal political instability resulting from these actions 
paved the way for the Communist government to distance themselves from Zhivkov‘s 
compaign and to eventually ask Zhivkov to resign his position in November 1998 
(Petkova 2002, 49).   
In November 1989, Zhivkov was replaced as head of the BCP, which changed its 
name to the Bulgarian Socialist Party.  Within weeks, the BSP reversed the failed 
assimilation policies as one of its first legal moves thus allowing those who had their 
names forcibly changed to reclaim their original names (Vasileva 1992, 347).   
Although thousands of Bulgarian Turks returned to Bulgaria before the fall of the 
Zhivkov government in November 1989, it was the explicit change in the Bulgarian 
government‘s own policies against the ―rebirth process‖ and the passing of the ―Names 
of Bulgarian Citizens Act‖ in December 1989 which encouraged the return to Bulgaria 
of nearly half of those who crossed into Turkey to escape the ethnic cleansing 
campaign. By March 1991, 600,000 ethnic Turks had applied for re-appropriation of 





In chapter two, it was demonstrated that the earliest constructions of modernist 




 centuries were shaped by political 
maneuvering and not as is commonly assumed to arise from ethnic or religious 
oppositions of primordial tensions between Bulgarian Christians vs. Turkish Muslims. 
In chapter three, it was demonstrated that heterogenizing and homogenizing 
imaginaries of the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries, were often negotiated through 
Bulgaria‘s fledgling attempts to define and differentiate itself both from its Ottoman 
past and its uneasy relationships with the competing interests of the Great Powers.  
This chapter has demonstrated the political realities of both the heterogenizing and 
homogenizing strategies employed under Communism to facilitate the establishment of 
a socialist nation.  Again, it seems clear it is not the presence of religious or ethnic 
differences themselves which explain the occurrences of violent identity-based 
conflicts, but rather it is the belief that homogenization will speed up the achievement 
of political goals accompanying Bulgaria‘s socialist secularization agenda. 
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Chapter Five: Summary and Conclusions 
 
A. Summary of the Project 
The overall argument will be reviewed in this chapter to demonstrate significant 
heterogenizing and homogenizing political influences throughout the three great 
transitional periods under review, namely: 1) the latter years of Ottoman dominion: 
1762-1877, 2) the end of the Balkan Wars and World Wars I and II: 1878-1947, and 
3) the latter years of the Communist dominion: 1947-1989.  In particular, in 
recapitulating the main case of each chapter, I will reinforce my contention that there is 
nothing inherent in the Bulgarian case to indicate that future generations of Bulgarians 
need revisit a violent homogenization or identity-based conflict on the scale witnessed 
in other parts of the world (Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Iraq, etc.) 
In this first chapter, I provided a general introduction to the research problem and a 
brief literature review situating this project within the existing literature.  I sought to 
frame the theoretical suppositions of the thesis in decidedly anti-primordialist terms 
while at the same time acknowledge the reality of ontological ethnic identity 
differentiation.  I also sought to demonstrate that my contribution to the existing 
research lay in providing a comprehensive understanding of the transitional periods 
under review in order to follow up on the work of Todorova and Neuburger while 
extending the comprehensive comparative analysis beyond that of the Christian vs. 
Turk and East vs. West oppositional framework. 
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In chapter two, it was demonstrated that there were legacies of ethnic, linguistic, 
and religious categories which were available to be utilized by nationalist vernacular 
mobilizers during the period of 1762-1878 to imagine a particular type of Bulgarian 
identity that was perceived to be Slavonic and Orthodox Christian.  It was also 
demonstrated that there was not necessarily a natural state of ―ethnic category‖ that 
could be attributed to Bulgaria apart from the mediating influences of political factors 
throughout history which have sought to define this identity over and against another.  
While, initially, the nationalist actors sought differentiation over against Roman 
Catholic and Greek Orthodox Christian influences, this identity only much later came 
to be defined in more stereotypical terms of the modern binary opposition of Christian 
vs. Muslim.  Other 19
th
 century European nationalist antecedents were noted as well, in 
addition to recognizing the role of Russian Pan-Slavism. 
In chapter three, it was demonstrated that heterogenizing and homogenizing 
imaginaries of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, were often negotiated through 
Bulgaria‘s fledgling attempts to define and differentiate itself not only from its Ottoman 
past but via its uneasy relationships with the competing interests of the Great Powers.  
This occurred through active language planning strategies, popularized fiction, and 
stops and starts for many attempts at establishing a stable national government, 
especially as they related to attempts to reclaim the borders of the Bulgarian territory as 
defined under the San Stefano Treaty. 
In chapter four, the political realities of both the heterogenizing and homogenizing 
strategies employed under Communism to facilitate the establishment of a socialist 
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nation was demonstrated.  Again, it seems clear it is not the presence of religious or 
ethnic differences themselves which explain the occurrences of violent identity-based 
conflicts, but rather it is the belief that homogenization will speed up the achievement 
of political goals accompanying Bulgaria‘s socialist secularization agenda. 
The validity of generalizing the results of this thesis to understand other parts of the 
Balkans will be discussed in addition to summaries of significant points along the 
trajectory of this thesis that might stimulate further research. 
 
B. Applications of the Project and Conclusion 
If, as it has hopefully been demonstrated, identity-based conflict in Bulgaria can be 
better explained by examining the contributions of nationalist political influences on 
identity construction rather than an inherent Balkan propensity to religious and ethnic 
intolerance, what kind of applications might there be for future research?  Below are a 
few areas that seem to me to be suggested by this thesis as deserving further research 
consideration. 
 
Areas for further research 
The Incentives Fulcrum 
One model that might explain how conditions in a given area can become 
conducive for the commission of the type of more aggressive homogenizing activities 
experienced by the Turks in Bulgaria during the 1980‘s is that of an incentives fulcrum.  
Although the phrase used is coined by the author, the concept mirrors that of Samantha 
57 
Power‘s concept of ―lack of will  (Power 2003, 508).‖  In describing what she means by 
lack of will she is referring to active calculations of risk and incentives that political 
actors weigh before deciding on how they will act in a given situation.  She contends 
that:  
In a democracy even an administration disinclined to act can be pressured into 
doing so.  This pressure can come from inside or outside.  Bureaucrats within 
the system who grasp the stakes can patiently lobby or brazenly agitate in the 




In my use of the phrase incentives fulcrum I am suggesting that in order for an 
action to occur, such as the intensified aggressive homogenization of ethnic Turks, the 
balance of interests or incentives for a potential perpetrator of such an act must be 
offset by disincentives for intervention by other parties.  Conversely, the cessation of 
such activities might logically occur when the disincentives for the perpetrator increase 
or the incentives for intervention by other parties increase.  Citing cases of genocide 
like the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, Power suggests in her discussion of political will 
that violent acts such as those described above are more likely to occur if other parties 
aware of the actions do not make much ―noise‖ in protest when they do occur (Power 
2003, 509).  
This process might work in the same way that a fulcrum works in the mechanics of 
a lever.  For example, if there are incentives for one party to undertake such activities 
and another party also has the incentive to intervene if the first party does so, then it is 
quite likely that a state of equilibrium is maintained which will prevent the action from 
occurring.  However, if the first party has the incentive to act and the second party 
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doesn‘t feel that it is in their interest to act, it is as if two children are on a see-saw and 
one scoots forward out of his seat and, as a result, the whole balance is thrown off 
leaving one child with his feet dangling in the air.  At the point in time when that child 
tires of being suspended, he merely needs to scoot back onto his seat and the 
equilibrium returns and the two children continue to relate as if each is of equal weight. 
It is my contention, naïve though it might appear to be at first, that national identity 
conflict need not occur in the current international climate if one party is ready to adjust 
his seating position so as to enable the power of the fulcrum to bring about a resolution 
to a situation of inequity.  This appears to be what happened when the Turkish 
minorities called Zhivkov‘s bluff and accepted his invitation for a ―grand excursion‖ 
into Turkey.  It was as if one of the children on the playground climbed off the teeter-
totter resulting in the other child‘s crashing return to the earth with a thud. 
I believe that this model might bear further testing to see if it is feasible and if it 
could be developed in a more sophisticated manner than that of a see-saw or teeter-
totter.  
Religious Identity and Differentiation 
Is it possible that one of the reasons why the religious distinctions in Bulgaria are 
less meaningful or less likely to arouse passionate disagreement over substance is 
because they are in a sense Christian or Islamic veneers over a functional folk religion 
predating the conversion of the Slavs to Christianity?  This seems to be hinted by 
Mazower but certainly bears further exploration (Mazower 2002, 54-76).  
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One possible way to explore this idea of shallow or deep religious identity or 
differentiation would be to conduct a comparative analysis between urban and rural 
Bulgarian communities alongside analogous communities in the former Yugoslav 
republics.  Of course, any type of research involving ascertaining religious identity is 
fraught with methodological challenges, but it would certainly be worth exploration if 
the study could be properly designed.  
Pan- Balkan Studies 
This thesis also clearly suggests the need for more in-depth comparative analyses 
between Bulgaria and the former Yugoslav republics of Serbia and Macedonia in 
particular to further test whether the experiences of both of these republics bear any 
resemblance to the political pressures exerted on Bulgaria during the same time 
periods. 
Other Transitional Heterogeneous Communities 
Further research is also needed into looking at other transitional states facing strong 
national or identity-based tensions such as Turkey, Rwanda, Sudan, Iraq, 
Israel/Palestine, etc.  Perhaps what is needed are some comparative analyses among 
some of the Bulgarian periods in combination with analogous transitional periods, 
perhaps post-colonial periods, with some of the aforementioned regions having 
histories of national identity-based conflicts.   
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Conclusion 
In conclusion, I would hope that further research into one or more of the above 
areas might contribute to the emergence of new opportunities to mitigate and/or 
perhaps reverse national identity tensions if the relevant political causal factors could be 
identified and clarified over against stereotypical appeals to unavoidable ethnic and 
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